This paper presents a simple power analysis attack against the key schedule of Camellia. The attack works for the smart card environment which leaks the Hamming weight of data being processed, making use of the Hamming weight to deduce all key bits. It is shown that determining the cipher key given accurate power analysis data is very fast and does not require any pair of plaintext and ciphertext.
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Hamming Weight Attack
To attack a block cipher with a 128-bit key running on an 8-bit processor, the leakage of Hamming weight information for each key byte as determined by the measurement of power consumption straightforwardly enables attackers to reduce the possible key space from 2 128 to 2 90.43 , as discussed in [6] . However, depending on the nature of a block cipher, the implementation of a Hamming weight attack could be much simpler than this reduced workload. For example, our attack exploits the redundancy in the key schedule of Camellia and determines all key bits without knowledge of any plaintext and ciphertext pair. 
Requirements for the Attack
The attack works with three prerequisites: 1) access to the power consumption information, 2) the ability to identify the clock cycles for individual steps in the key schedule (e.g., using the method suggested in [3] ), and 3) a monotonic relation between power and Hamming weight.
Attack Against Subkey Generation
Our attack is implemented through two steps. The first step exploits the rotational relations between K L and the resultant subkeys; the second step will exploit relations in the derivation of As shown in Figure 2 , each rotation of K L gives a chance to consider bits with a different byte partition due to the shift of bit-positions with bytes. Assuming 8m+4 adjacent bits of K L are unknown, up to 5m Hamming weights collected through power measurement can be used to validate candidates for these key bits. Based on these checks, a dynamic pruning method can be used to reduce the search space over all 8m+4 bits.
The key K L may be divided into 4 overlapped parts
and K L[92∼127] so that they can be processed quickly and independently. Each part produces a number of 36-bit candidates (i.e., m = 4). Any four candidates from these four parts can be joined into one K L guess when their overlapped bits are consistent. When applied to Camellia's key schedule with 20 randomly generated cipher keys, an average of about 2 38 candidates of the full K L pass this step.
Attack Against the Derivation of K A
In this section, we examine the second step in the attack, which gains more key information from the steps involved in the derivation of key K A . In the first round illustrated in Figure 1 , each byte of K L 's left half (denoted as T 0 ), is XORed with constant Σ 1 . The result is denoted as
The following S-function is byte-wise substitution, denoted as We applied this attack to Camellia's 128-bit key schedule with 10,000 randomly generated sample keys. The experimental results listed in Table 1 show that 2 rounds of Hamming weight checks in K A 's derivation is enough for unique key identification in most cases. The attack can be easily extended to 192-bit and 256-bit key schedules [5] . 
Conclusion
When Camellia is implemented in a device with Hamming weight leakage due to power measurements, it is very important for implementors to consider appropriate countermeasures. The vulnerability of many ciphers to similar attacks and practical countermeasures have been discussed in [5] .
